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South African invocations of an analogy  
and its associated lessons
Gary Baines
This paper examines the use of the Vietnam analogy by protago-
nists involved in conflicts in the African sub-continent during the 
1970s–1980s, known variously as the Apartheid Wars, the Angolan-
Namibian War or the Border War. It also analyses the attendant but typi-
cally specious lessons that military and political leaders are inclined to 
draw from the Vietnam analogy. It suggests that politicians and military 
professionals do not actually learn from the past: history provides a rhe-
torical device rather than an analytical tool and serves a political rather 
than a pedagogical purpose.
In 1973, the historian Ernest R. May published “Lessons” of the Past: The 
Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. He advocated that 
foreign policy framers adopt a more considered and informed approach 
to what history supposedly teaches. The book propounded three theses: 
that foreign policymakers are often influenced by what they perceive to 
the “lessons” of history; that they ordinarily use history badly; and that 
they could use history more accurately with help from professional histo-
rians. In order to make his argument that statesmen sometimes perceive 
problems in terms of analogies from the past and historical parallels that 
provide portends for the future, May offered case studies of the ways in 
which such thinking influenced American decision making in respect 
of World War II, the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam. Writing before the 
US withdrawal from Vietnam, he adduces evidence to show that both 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations drew inferences from a range 
of historical events. May reckons that much of the reasoning was flawed 
and superficial. He claims that advisers invoked analogies from previous 
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conflicts “with utter disregard for expertise or even the inherent logic 
of their assertions.” But possibly even more telling is that they had little 
knowledge of and ignored Vietnamese history.1 While this was still the 
case with subsequent administrations, they were to become well versed in 
the vocabulary of the Vietnam War.
More recent research has confirmed that May was correct to insist 
that the citation of historical analogies is commonplace among Ameri-
can military and political leaders who seek to draw lessons from the past 
and apply these to the making of policy decisions. Indeed, the arsenal of 
analogies at their disposal has grown exponentially. Recurring analogies 
include warnings to heed the lessons gleaned from 1930s-style appease-
ment of warmongers, the avoidance of repeating mistakes that contrib-
uted to the “loss” of China, and so on.2 But the Vietnam experience 
is the weapon of choice in the arsenal; it has been invoked with respect 
to the Gulf War, the “War on Terror,” and virtually every other military 
action involving the deployment of troops on the ground since the 1970s. 
More often than not, it is regarded as a mistake not to be repeated or as 
providing a predictor of an outcome to be averted.3 So for US President 
George H.W. Bush (snr) the lesson of Vietnam was that soldiers should 
not be asked to “fight with one hand behind their back” and be given all 
the support needed to win the war. Following the expulsion of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait, Bush proclaimed that the US had kicked the Vietnam syn-
drome once and for all.4 He turned the narrative on its head. As Marilyn 
Young notes:
Initially the Vietnam syndrome referred to the reluctance of the public 
to engage in war. Now it is the government of the country that is caught 
1 Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign 
Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 119–121.
2 David Hoogland Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on Terror, 
and the Uses of Historical Memory,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7:3 (2004): 339–366.
3 James H. Willbanks, “The Legacy of the Vietnam War for the US Army,” – America and the 
Vietnam War: Re-examining the Culture and History of a Generation, eds. Andrew Wiest, Mary 
Kathryn Barbier and Glenn Robins (New York: Routledge, 2010), 271–288.
4  Molly Andrews, Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 101–103.
229The Vocabulary of the Vietnam War
in its grip, convinced that the only cure for that long-ago defeat is yet 
more war.5
It is precisely because its lessons are not necessarily self-evident that the 
Vietnam analogy can be utilised to suit any political agenda or course of 
action.
May was the first but not the only proponent of the notion that the 
lessons that policy makers derive from historical events exert a consider-
able and often crucial impact upon the framing and implementation of 
policy. For such scholars analogies serve as frameworks or schemas that 
inform decision-making.6 However, certain scholars are sceptical of the 
assumption that policymakers invoke analogies to make decisions. They 
doubt whether it is necessary to resort to cognitive structures like histori-
cal analogies to explain the choices of policymakers. Instead, they suggest 
that analogies are used to explain a conclusion already reached on the 
basis of ideology and political positioning. In other words, an analogy 
provides a post-hoc justification for arriving at a decision rather than a 
schema shaping it.7 It seems safe to say that analogies may be employed 
before and after the fact but that “lessons” derived therefrom are obvi-
ously determined retrospectively.
This paper examines the use of the Vietnam analogy by certain pro-
tagonists involved in conflicts in the African sub-continent during the 
1970s–80s, known variously as the Apartheid Wars, the Angolan-Namib-
ian War or the Border War.8 I approach the task well aware that this 
5 Marilyn Young, “Still Stuck in the Big Muddy,” – Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of His-
tory after the Fall of Communism, ed. Ellen Schrecker (New York: The New Press, 2004), 270.
6 David Houghton, “The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations,” 
British Journal of Political Science 26:4 (1996): 524. 
7 See Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Viet-
nam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 8–9; A.J. Taylor and J.T. 
Tourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process,” The Journal of Poli-
tics 52:2 (1995): 460–468.
8 The nomenclature is a not so much a matter of dispute as one of perspective. Whereas the 
white electorate called the conflict in Angola-Namibia the “Border War,” or sometimes the 
“bush war,” those fighting against the apartheid regime preferred other terms. For SWAPO it 
was the War of National Liberation, otherwise known as the Namibian War of Independence. 
Namibia and South Africa were arguably theatres of the same conflict and liberation move-
230 Gary Baines
exercise might serve to reify the Vietnam analogy. Hence I am not so 
much concerned with the merits of the comparisons as I am with why 
and to what purpose they have been appropriated. I will then examine the 
attendant but typically specious lessons that military and political leaders 
are inclined to draw from the Vietnam analogy. Rather than seek to vali-
date May’s proposition that such leaders can be better educated about the 
past and actually learn from it, I think we need to acknowledge that for 
them history serves a political rather than a pedagogical purpose. While 
professional historians should not countenance nor become party to such 
tendencies and are bound to question the uses and abuses of history,9 
we do not own the past. As practitioners we would do well to recognise 
that much more is invested in memory politics than simply representing 
the past accurately. Public memory arguably eclipses the importance of 
academic history insofar as it represents a body of beliefs and ideas that 
enable a society to understand its past, present and future. As such, it 
reflects the structure and dynamics of power in society.
The symbolic power of language:  
analogies and metaphors
The meaning of a war is (re)produced within a linguistic field that is 
redolent with material and symbolic relations of power.10 Thus figures 
of speech such as analogies, metaphors and tropes constitute a form of 
knowledge about the past that has rhetorical resonance and assumes 
a kind of “symbolic power” that may be marshalled in much the same 
way as material power. Political and cultural elites have recourse to such 
symbols of knowledge so that they become the stock in trade of opinion 
ments in the latter referred to their fight against the South African security forces as the armed 
and/or liberation struggle. Recently, scholars have taken to speaking of the “Apartheid Wars” or 
even the “Thirty Years War.” See, for instance, Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation 
Struggle: The Double-Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995).
9 Jeremy Black, Using History (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005); Margaret MacMillan, The 
Uses and Abuses of History (London: Exmouth Books, 2008).
10 Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy,” 347.
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shapers and decision makers. This is not to deny that power is contested 
in a world of ideological difference and finds expression in different cul-
tural understandings of the world and one’s own society.11 Nor is it to 
deny that both within the corridors of power and the public sphere at 
large there may be differences of opinion over the meaning of the past 
(and particular events that are thought to have a bearing on the present). 
But negotiating these power dynamics requires the construction and/or 
appropriation of a narrative that becomes operative as a framework for 
self-understanding.12
Within this linguistic (mine?)field, figures of speech serve a predica-
tive function that allows the user to relate two or more different entities 
by establishing a similitude of some kind between them.13 Thus analo-
gies suggest that the present bears a striking resemblance to the past and 
generate expectations that the future, too, might do so.14 They posit a 
perceived likeness between two entities, whereas a metaphor communi-
cates that likeness.
Allow me to elaborate. An analogy allows us to compare what is known 
about one domain, realm of experience or set of events with something 
similar.15 In the words of Elliott, analogies “[...] serve as a cognitive filter 
that transforms the unfamiliar into something recognizable and reduces 
complexity to manageable proportions.”16 Whereas analogies allow us to 
compare like things, metaphors compare unrelated things that are drawn 
from distinctly different realms of experience. Analogies might be useful 
11 Jan-Werner Muller, “Introduction: The power of memory, the memory of power and the 
power over memory,” – Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, ed. Jan-Werner Muller (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 24–25.
12 David Glassberg, “Public History and the Study of Memory,” The Public Historian 18:2 
(1996): 1.
13 David Panagia, “The Predicative Function in Ideology: On the Political Uses of Analogical 
Reasoning in Contemporary Political Thought,” Journal of Political Ideologies 6 (2001): 57.
14 Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy,” 342 citing Panagia, “The Predicative Function in 
Ideology.”
15 Keith L. Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Political Psychology 
15:4 (1994): 658–659.
16 David Elliott, “Parallel Wars? Can ‘Lessons of Vietnam’ be applied to Iraq?,” – Iraq and 
the Lessons of Vietnam, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young (New York: New Press, 
2007), 18.
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for finding historical precedents for new situations, but metaphors “pro-
vide an underlying intellectual construct for framing the situation, for 
viewing the world, an outlook which creates some degree of order and 
expectations.”17 In other words, metaphors offer a comparative frame of 
reference that helps understand something outside one’s previous range of 
experience or field of knowledge; they help to make sense of novel situa-
tions. This is especially the case when we do not have the necessary cogni-
tive and linguistic tools to create new categories of meaning.18 A metaphor 
can provide a mental picture of something familiar that is referenced to 
make sense of something that is unfamiliar. The process involves making 
comparisons based on perceived resemblances (induction) and then infer-
ring additional similarities (deduction). Metaphorical reasoning allows for 
the crossing of categorical boundaries so as to translate the literal world 
of one’s experience into an imaginary world resembling that of another. It 
offers a cognitive shortcut so as to make sense of complex issues.19
I have already noted that Americans have access to an arsenal of anal-
ogies in order to make or justify policy decisions. The vocabulary of the 
Vietnam War finds ready purchase among advisers, speechwriters, lobby-
ists, and so on. But the US political and military authorities also employ 
metaphors such as “quagmire” or “slippery slope” drawn from the experi-
ence of having become entangled in Vietnam. This illustrates the German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s point that they have license to pick and 
choose whatever they think suits the occasion – that we can speak of a 
mobile army of metaphors.20 Each in its own way seeks to provide com-
mon frames of reference or a good fit between one situation and another. 
But analogies and metaphors only facilitate the understanding a given 
conflict situation when one is able to relate it to pre-existing experience 
and knowledge. But even a lack of reliable intelligence can create an infor-
17 Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making,” 685.
18 David N. Livingstone & Richard T. Harrison, “Meaning through Metaphor: Analogy as 
Epistemology,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 71:1 (1981): 96.
19 Khong, Analogies at War.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language. Transl. Sander L. Gil-
man, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 250 cited in Noon, “Operation Enduring 
Analogy,” 343.
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mation vacuum in which the appearance of knowledge has power. What-
ever the case, this requires the imaginative (re)construction of past wars 
even when these were waged far apart in space and time. The capacity to 
imagine one war as another suggests the enduring power of analogies and 
metaphors, and the pervasive influence of symbolic forms of knowledge.
Imagining one war as another
The Border War waged by the apartheid state sought to perpetuate the fic-
tion that the troops of the South African Defence Force (SADF) were pro-
tecting South Africa’s border and not actually fighting on foreign soil.21 
Indeed, the phrase Border War encodes white South African understand-
ing of the nature of the conflict in Angola/Namibia in the same way as the 
term Vietnam War represents an American perspective on the conflict in 
which they were involved in south-east Asia. In this section of the paper, 
I will construct a narrative that suggests that the conflicts in south-east 
Asia and southern Africa resembled one another, that they were partly 
analogous.
Following the departure of the Portuguese forces from Angola and 
Mozambique and the resultant collapse of part of South Africa’s cordon 
sanitaire, southern Africa became a “hot spot” in the Cold War. The stakes 
were reckoned to be as high as in south-east Asia. The 27 February 1976 
edition of The Guardian newspaper commented that: “If the watershed 
of history was Vietnam, the fatal blow to imperialism and Western capi-
tal at home itself could very well be in South Africa.”22 And many pun-
dits, especially area experts based in Washington and Moscow, expressed 
the view that southern Africa would succeed Vietnam as the epicentre 
of the Cold War.23 The South African government adopted an ideology 
21 David Williams, On the Border: The White South African Military Experience 1965–1990 
(Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2008), 117.
22 Cited in Magnus Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 
2006), 80.
23 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our 
Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 207; James Sanders, South Africa and 
the International Media: A Struggle for Representation (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 152.
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similar to that of the USA, one that essentially justified the conflicts as 
necessary to contain the spread of international communism and uphold 
Western civilisation. The rhetoric was different: American cold warriors 
invoked the domino theory that held forth the spectre of the collapse of 
Vietnam’s neighbours to communism following the US defeat whereas 
apartheid’s defenders spoke of the need to erect “buffer states” to com-
bat the “total onslaught.” Both these discourses were shaped by politi-
cal cultures suffused with strident anti-communism, a paranoid fear of 
the Soviet Union, and an obsession with security. Hallin notes that “The 
ideology of the Cold War was ideally suited to the reduction of this com-
plexity [of the nature of the conflict]: it related every crisis to a single, 
familiar axis of conflict.”24 The Cold War paradigm allowed South Africa 
to justify its interventions in Angola and its occupation of Namibia by 
claiming that it had positioned itself on the side of the West against Com-
munism. The West, for its part, often applied double standards when it 
refused to condemn the apartheid regime’s repression of and discrimina-
tion against black subjects for fear of alienating the strongest state in the 
African sub-continent. Sanders shows that American and British media 
were generally prepared to accept a different set of conditions for the 
country’s black population because South Africa managed to convince 
itself and the West that it was an indispensable ally in the war against 
communism.25
Soon after US forces completed their withdrawal from Saigon in 
1975, SADF troops invaded Angola ostensibly to prevent SWAPO (South 
West Africa People’s Organisation) from establishing bases in the south-
ern part of the country from where it might infiltrate Namibia, which 
was illegally occupied by the SADF. A pretext was provided by the need 
to secure the Ruacana hydro-electric facility on the Angolan-Namibian 
border. It was a “false flag” operation analogous to the trumped-up Gulf 
of Tonkin incident that was used to convince the Johnson administration 
to step up its commitment to Saigon against Hanoi. The seizure of these 
24 Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley, Ca.: University of 
California Press, 1986), 50.
25 Sanders, South Africa and the International Media, 8.
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border sites provided a convenient cover story for the SADF’s interven-
tion after the fact.26 It afforded a plausible deniability.
South Africa’s subsequent intervention in Angola’s civil war was an 
attempt to prevent the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola) from gaining control of the country’s capital, Luanda. Pretoria 
lent support to its allies, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation 
of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola). According to some sources, the SADF served as a proxy for the 
USA, who was reluctant to commit combat troops to Angola after the 
loss of Vietnam.27 However, others dismiss the contention that the US 
encouraged South African intervention and hold that it based its decision 
on strategic calculations derived from threat perceptions.28 In any event, 
the SADF did not achieve its objectives following the arrival of Cubans 
after Castro unilaterally became determined to show solidarity with the 
MPLA government and support its armed forces in the face of the aggres-
sion by the racist apartheid regime.29 The South African decision was also 
informed by worldwide condemnation of Pretoria’s adventurism and its 
violation of Angola’s territorial integrity. In the event, the SADF aborted 
Operation Savannah and withdrew its forces from Angola. Additionally, 
the Vietnam analogy preyed upon the minds of the SADF leadership. The 
“hawkish” Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, apparently shared his unease 
with his generals about becoming bogged down in Angola.30 In similar 
vein, General Magnus Malan, then Chief of the SADF, notes that the deci-
sion to invade Angola in 1975 was not taken lightly as he was concerned 
that South Africa might create its own Vietnam if it did so.31 Malan was 
possibly acquainted with the slippery slope and quagmire metaphors that 
26 James Miller, “Yes, Minister: Reassessing South Africa’s Intervention in Angola, 1975,” Jour-
nal of Cold War Studies 15:3 (2013): 21–22.
27 Matthew Graham, “Covert Collusion? American and South African Relations in the Ango-
lan Civil War, 1975–76,” African Historical Review 43:1 (2011): 35.
28 Miller, “Yes, Minister,” 41.
29 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria (Alberton: Galago, 
1999).
30 Geldenhuys, Die Wat Wen, 177 cited in Leopold Scholtz, The SADF in the Border War 1966–
1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013), 334.
31 Malan, My Life in the SADF, 117.
236 Gary Baines
were common in American discourse of the Vietnam War. Such meta-
phors suggested that it was difficult to extricate armed forces that were 
committed to prop up a regime that did not have popular support. The 
provision of advisers, troops and matériel had to make up for the inability 
of a client (or puppet) regime to fight its own battles. In fact, the Saigon 
regime and UNITA were equally dependent on their sponsors for their 
very survival. But withdrawal by their backers would amount to the loss 
of face and damage to the reputation of the sponsor state.
Cuba, under Castro’s leadership, provided Luanda with significant 
support troops, as well as copious amounts of sophisticated military hard-
ware to bolster the capacity of the People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of 
Angola (FAPLA). Although the Cubans generally avoided direct engage-
ment with the SADF, the armies were involved in a number of skirmishes 
in the in the early years of the war and full-blown battles in 1987–1988 
culminating in the siege of Cuito Cuanavale. For its part, the Soviet Union 
supported the MPLA government with arms and advisors but was seldom 
drawn into the fighting.32 It became commonplace for the SADF to dis-
play captured Soviet or Eastern Bloc manufactured weapons as well as the 
occasional Cuban or Russian prisoner-of-war (POW) as proof the com-
munist threat to the security of the white redoubt in the region. Such exer-
cises were staged as propaganda coups but a gullible public seldom both-
ered to consider that whatever the origin of arms and ammunition, they 
have no ideology and no purpose other than to kill. Although the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc countries backed southern Africa’s Marxist 
governments and national liberation movements ideologically, diplomati-
cally, strategically and militarily, Soviet apologists insist that they never 
posed a threat to South Africa.33 This did not prevent P.W. Botha, who 
held the defence portfolio as Prime Minister and then appointed Magnus 
Malan, in the portfolio when he became president, from ratcheting up the 
alarmist “total onslaught” discourse. Botha side-lined the “doves” in his 
32 Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War:” the USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 
2008).
33 Vladimir Shubin and Marina Traikova, “There is no threat from the Eastern Bloc,” South 
African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol-
ume 3, International Solidarity (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008), 985–1067.
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cabinet and articulated threat perceptions that turned into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.34 So his fear of an Angolan quagmire was realised.
In South Africa and Namibia, the black majority’s “freedom fighter” 
was the white minority’s “terrorist.” Initially units of the South African 
Police (SAP) with counter-insurgency (COIN) training were tasked with 
combating “terrorism” but as the struggle intensified the SADF assumed 
increasing responsibility for security matters. The armed wing of the Afri-
can National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), was effectively 
neutralised until the late 1970s when it resorted to acts of armed propa-
ganda. MK staged some spectacular sabotage operations against mainly 
military and industrial targets during the 1980s but never managed to 
operate openly above ground. PLAN (the Peoples’ Liberation Army of 
Namibia) established a base temporarily at Omgulumbashe in the 1960s 
but was unable to replicate guerrilla tactics practiced in Cuba or Vietnam 
where liberated zones were the rule and not the exception – unlike the 
case of Namibia after the SADF assumed charge of COIN operations.35 
Initially, PLAN’s lines of communication and infiltration were lengthy as 
it operated from its Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) headquarters, but it was 
able to relocate to bases in Angola with the sanction of the MPLA gov-
ernment. Namibia’s sub-tropical climate, combined with the flat, sandy 
landscape dotted with thick mopani savannah did not offer much cover 
to guerrillas infiltrating the country. The wet season (usually December 
to March) improved their chances of avoiding detection as the dense 
foliage provided a measure of concealment and rain erased tracks and 
provided drinking water. The ability of PLAN combatants to escape pur-
suing patrols while on foot in the semi-arid conditions won them the 
begrudging admiration of SADF soldiers. This was not unlike the respect 
that American GIs developed for National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet 
Cong guerrillas who seemed at one with Vietnam’s terrain of jungles, ele-
phant grass, and rice paddies. The enervating climate sapped the energies 
of the US forces much more so than the NLF guerrillas. And their will to 
win a protracted conflict did not match the endurance of the Vietnamese 
34 Miller, “Yes, Minister,” 31.
35 Dale, “A Comparative Reconsideration of the Namibian Bush War,” 205.
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peasants who provided for them and were prepared to defend hamlet and 
homestead interminably. In short, the US forces were simply concerned 
with survival in a distant land in a war not of their own making or choos-
ing. Whilst some SADF soldiers could not understand the purpose of 
fighting and dying for a “strip of desert,” the proximity of Namibia to 
South Africa gave some credibility to the argument that it was preferable 
to fight the “enemy” in a neighbour’s backyard than in one’s own. More-
over, the SADF was also dedicated to defending the small population of 
white “Suidwesters” who were regarded as South African citizens. There 
was no comparable American expatriate community in Vietnam.
Both the South African and American forces evinced a total disregard 
for the countries that they were occupying, as well as scant concern for its 
peoples. The US policy of “pacification” implemented in the countryside 
was an endeavour to place the peasant population under the protection 
of the US and South Vietnamese armies in order to prevent their villages 
from falling to the NLF. This frequently involved the forcible relocation 
of communities from their traditional lands into a more easily defensible 
compound in which they were dependent not on their own resources 
but US largesse for survival – as was the case with Operation Phoenix. 
This was exceptionally disruptive to the social fabric of Vietnamese soci-
ety. The US forces and the South Vietnamese army made extensive use of 
defoliants such as Agent Orange and incendiary devices such as napalm to 
clear and destroy large areas of the natural habitat so as to prevent the NLF 
from hiding in areas where there was dense undergrowth. These acts did 
long-term damage to the environment, including the polluting of valuable 
water supplies. The US Air Force also carried out a systematic and pro-
longed campaign of area/carpet bombing that destroyed vast tracts of land 
and infrastructure and left tens of thousands of Vietnamese homeless. In 
fact, the US dropped more ordnance on Indochinese targets from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s than on European and Japanese cities during 
the Second World War and killed more people in the process.36 The SADF 
36 Marilyn Young, “Bombing Civilians from the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Centuries,” – 
Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-Century History, ed. Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn B. Young (New 
York: The New Press, 2009), 157.
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did kill a large (but unknown) number of inhabitants of the “frontline 
states” in the name of safeguarding white security as its “destabilisation” 
policies caused considerable physical destruction, social dislocation, and 
psychological trauma throughout the region. The South African Air Force 
(SAAF) used cluster bombs but made sparing use of napalm and chem-
ical weapons.37 It had a small nuclear arsenal of only six bombs that it 
developed for deterrent purposes but never utilised.38 If weapons of mass 
destruction were discounted by South Africa and the US as unnecessary 
to win their respective wars in southern Africa and south-east Asia, then 
this could be deemed a saving grace for the regions. But the deleterious 
legacy of these wars is still felt as a result of the thousands of undetected 
mines that were laid during these conflicts and which continue to kill and 
maim people.
For the most part, the Great Powers remained on the side-lines of 
the conflict in Angola/Namibia. The US government adopted a delicate 
balancing act supporting South Africa without appearing to endorse 
apartheid. Successive US administrations aided and abetted the survival 
of the country’s minority white regime that became something of a pariah 
state in the community of nations. The US deflected pressure brought to 
bear against the apartheid state on the economic, cultural and diplomatic 
fronts but rendered little military aid and chose not to bypass United 
Nations boycotts. Relations between the US and South Africa became 
strained when the former withdrew its clandestine support of the SADF’s 
invasion of Angola in 1975 and subsequently passed the Clark Amend-
ment barring military aid. Because South Africa sought validation for its 
actions by way of American approval it nursed a strong resentment when 
this was withdrawn. Whilst South Africa’s relations with the US improved 
as result of the Reagan administration’s policy of “constructive engage-
37 I have documented at least two occasions on which SAAF planes dropped napalm during 
aerial assaults on SWAPO bases in neighbouring states in the 1980s. And the Angolan authori-
ties made unsubstantiated allegations that the SADF and/or UNITA deployed chemical gas 
during the battle of the Lomba River in 1987. See Gary Baines, “Review Article: From Uni-
formed Technocrat to Securocrat: Magnus Malan’s Memoir,” Historia 54:1 (2009): 321–322.
38 Anna-Mart Van Wyk, “The USA and apartheid South Africa’s nuclear aspirations, 1949–
1980,” – Onslow, Southern Africa in the Cold War,” 55–83.
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ment,” the US could not be seen to be endorsing the former’s oppressive 
racist policies.39 Still, the US condoned the apartheid regime’s obduracy 
in finding a political solution to the impasse in Namibia when it failed 
to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 and 
turned a blind eye to the apartheid regime’s destabilization of its neigh-
bours. US support was arguably at least partly responsible for offsetting 
some of the effects of disinvestment and sanctions, but nonetheless South 
Africa’s economic and manpower resources were stretched to the limit by 
the Border War. In fact, the proportion of GDP spent on the defence bud-
get increased about sixteenfold between 1974–75 and 1988–89.40 Given 
the arms embargo and financial constraints, and notwithstanding the 
development of the local arms industry, the SADF leadership frequently 
bemoaned its lack of resources. Their American counterparts did like-
wise, although the USA armed forces were in a league of their own when 
it came to state-of-the-art weaponry.
Although US defence spending increased incrementally during the 
Vietnam War, there can be little doubt that South African society was 
far more thoroughly militarised during the 1970s and 1980s than was 
the US in the Vietnam War era. Still, American society has been infused 
with − even dominated by − military culture, values and goals and might 
be termed a “garrison state” on account of the influence of the military-
industrial complex.41 This is not the place to detail the specificities of the 
situation and the workings of the security establishment of what has been 
called South Africa’s “garrison state” under P.W. Botha’s leadership.42 Suf-
fice it to say, the articulation of Botha’s “total strategy” gave the securo-
crats who controlled the National Security Management System that sanc-
tioned the illegal activities of the SAP, SADF, and other agencies of the 
39 J.E. Davies, Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, 
Namibia & Angola (Oxford: James Currey, 2007).
40 Ian van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 
2015), 270.
41 Richell Bernazolli and Colin Flint, “Embodying the garrison state? Everyday geographies of 
militarization in American society,” Political Geography 29 (2010): 157–166.
42 Bernard Magubane, “From Détente to the Rise of the Garrison State in South African Edu-
cation Democracy Trust,” – The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970–1980] 
(Pretoria: Unisa Press 2006), 37–97.
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state the means to subvert the legislature and seize control of the execu-
tive.43 Simultaneously, socialisation in the homes, churches, and schools 
bred conformity that caused white males and their families to accept 
national service as a rite of passage and regard ongoing military duties 
(such as camps) as a necessary price to pay for upholding white power 
and privilege. In the US a disproportionate burden of bearing arms in 
Vietnam was the lot of minority groups who did not have the same stake 
in the system as South Africa’s white ruling elite. South Africa apparently 
suffered more casualties as a proportion of the white population than the 
rate sustained by the US as a proportion of its total population.44 Both the 
South African and American governments were wary that high casualty 
rates would become politically unsustainable. Neither the US nor South 
Africa were willing sacrifice their men in uniform to the extent that their 
respective enemies were prepared to do.45 Fighting such a limited war was 
never going to guarantee victory at any price for either country.
In South Africa opposition to conscription gained some momentum 
from the mid-1980s as the demands made by the state on the cohort 
of young white males increased exponentially. Foremost amongst the 
groups that articulated opposition to the compulsory call-up was the End 
Conscription Campaign (ECC). The ECC made extensive use of artwork 
to counter the propaganda of the apartheid state. The Vietnam analogy 
was employed in the following poster.
The SADF soldier’s hands appear to be inflicting damage upon 
Namibia. Yet, the image also seems to suggest that the occupying forces 
faced the spectre of defeat; that they would have to withdraw from 
Namibia as had been the case with American soldiers in Vietnam. The 
poster’s design would have resonated with SADF soldiers who referred 
to Namibia/South West Africa as “Nam.” These soldiers also referred to 
43 Dylan Craig, “Total Justification: Ideological Manipulation and South Africa’s Border War,” 
– Baines and Vale, Beyond the Border War, 56–74.
44 According to Professor R. Green, the official death rate of white troops killed on the border, 
expressed as a proportion of all white South Africans, was three times that of the US forces in 
Vietnam. See The Cape Times, 4 Jan. 1985, cited in Catholic Institute of International Relations, 
Out of Step: War Resistance in South Africa (London: CIIR, 1989), 31.
45 Rudham, “Lost Soldiers from Lost Wars,” 36.
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South Africa or home as “the States.” Their jargon suggests that they asso-
ciated their presence in Namibia with being occupiers of a foreign land. 
But it was the deployment of troops in the townships to crush insurrec-
tion, thereby implying that ordinary black people were the “enemy,” that 
catalysed opposition to conscription and increased the numbers of citizen 
force members who ignored call-ups for camps. Although its relatively 
small size meant that the ECC remained a peripheral pressure group, 
attempts to suppress it suggest that the government feared the disrup-
tion of the national service system.46 By comparison, American anti-war 
movements were able to mobilise growing numbers against the draft, and 
these included many veterans who joined organisations such as Vietnam 
46 Merran Phillips, “The End Conscription Campaign 1983–1988: A Study of White Extra-
Parliamentary Opposition to Apartheid” (MA thesis, University of South Africa, 2002).
(ECC Archives, University 
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Veterans Against the War (VVAW). The Vietnam War became increas-
ingly unpopular after the media exposure of the Tet offensive revealed 
that a US victory was neither imminent nor inevitable.47 Indeed, opposi-
tion to the war coalesced across many sectors of society once it became 
apparent that US government and military spokespersons were deliber-
ately manipulating and falsifying official news releases. The credibility 
gap became a yearning one. But contrary to Rudham,48 I do not believe 
that the Border War ever became as unpopular as the Vietnam War.
The outcome of the Vietnam War meant that the US suffered a setback 
to its standing in the international community and its status as a super 
power. This created the so-called Vietnam syndrome that translated into 
reluctance by the US to interfere in the domestic affairs of other coun-
tries where the administration reckoned that its national interests were 
threatened. However, there was no accompanying domestic political cri-
sis although the US had undoubtedly suffered a defeat in Vietnam. Nixon 
was brought down by Watergate and not Vietnam. The “fall” of South 
Vietnam also revealed the fallacy of the domino theory, for neighbour-
ing south-east Asian states did not collapse to communism like a deck of 
cards (to mix my metaphors). In the southern African sub-continent the 
withdrawal of the SADF from Angola/Namibia and the implementation 
of UN Security Council Resolution 435 was no less dramatic, especially as 
it occurred in tandem with the end of the Cold War and set in motion a 
sequence of events that culminated in South Africa’s transition to major-
ity rule. The Namibian settlement was followed by a “ceasefire” in South 
Africa and a relatively peaceful political transition. Still, Botha’s succes-
sor, President Frederik Willem de Klerk, was regarded by right-wingers 
as having betrayed the Afrikaner and/or white “nation” especially after he 
purged the SADF for its apparent involvement in “third force” activities.49 
But the majority of the white electorate embraced – albeit with some trep-
idation – the dismantling of the apartheid edifice. Still, the South Afri-
can government could claim – with some justification − that its military 
47 Hallin, The Uncensored War.
48 Rudham, “Lost Soldiers from Lost Wars.”
49 Hilton Hamann, Days of the Generals (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2001).
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forces were withdrawn from Angola and Namibia as part of a negotiated 
settlement. It could also claim that the SADF never really engaged with 
MK in battle as the latter was never able to wage anything more than 
a low-key war of insurgency. It insisted that any victory claimed by the 
liberation movements was mere politicking as the SADF had effected a 
tactical withdrawal for the sake of promoting a peaceful transition.
Retired SADF generals did not take kindly to attempts by the ANC 
government to hold them accountable for death squads that carried out 
assassinations, bizarre experiments with chemical weapons, and other 
nefarious activities that occurred under their watch. A clique of for-
mer generals obstructed the work of the Truth & Reconciliation Com-
mission (TRC) in investigating gross violations of human rights by the 
military. They denied, for instance, that the Cassinga massacre was a 
war crime and defended the attack on this SWAPO camp in Angola as 
a military operation in which some refugees were caught in the cross-
fire.50 The SADF followed the lead of the US military that invented the 
euphemism “collateral damage” to justify the killing of innocent civil-
ians.51 The immunity of non-combatants in modern warfare is a myth 
perpetrated by the US military that exhibits a culpable lack of concern for 
victims” lives and property.52 Thus the indiscriminate slaughter of non-
combatants in the infamous My Lai massacre was treated as an aberra-
tion rather than a consequence of the strategies pursued by US forces in 
Vietnam.53 In this instance, a junior officer became the “fall guy” for his 
superiors. Although the SADF did charge a few of its personnel for hei-
nous crimes such as murder and rape, in other instances reprehensible 
acts went unpunished because the President granted perpetrators immu-
nity from prosecution for acts supposedly committed in good faith in the 
50 Gary Baines, “A Battle for Perceptions: Revisiting the Cassinga Controversy in Southern 
Africa,” – Theatres of Violence: The Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity in History, ed. Philip 
Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan (New York: Berghahn, 2011), 226–241.
51 Stephen J. Rockell and Rick Halpern (eds.), Inventing Collateral Damage: Civilian Casual-
ties, War, and Empire (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009).
52 Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity and Atrocities 
after World War II (New York: Routledge, 2006).
53 Kendrick Oliver, The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 2006).
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line of duty.54 The SADF held that it observed the rules of engagement 
despite not officially being at war with SWAPO and that the SADF’s code 
of conduct was strictly enforced in the ranks. However, South Africa did 
not ratify the 1977 amendment to the Geneva Protocol that accorded cap-
tured “freedom fighters” the status of POWs. It was believed that granting 
POW status to PLAN or MK cadres would have legitimated the insur-
gency. Instead, captured ANC and SWAPO cadres were treated as “terror-
ists” and subjected to abuse and torture. Some were “turned” and became 
askaris (collaborators). The use of torture, ostensibly for gathering intelli-
gence, became an integral part of American and South African operating 
procedures.55 Wartime violence contributed to the brutalisation of both 
Vietnamese and South African society.
Although stories of the maltreatment of enemy soldiers have emerged 
in published accounts of the Border War, there has been a reluctance on 
the part of SADF veterans to accept responsibility for such acts. Whereas 
at least 100 US veterans confessed to having committed or witnessed 
atrocities in Vietnam during the Winter Soldier hearings of 1971,56 there 
was no comparative admission of culpability by SADF generals or their 
foot soldiers before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).57 
Moreover, the SADF assumed no responsibility for the conduct of its prox-
ies such as the paramilitary units Koevoet and Battalion 32, both of which 
had deservedly unsavoury reputations for their tactics, which included 
impersonating PLAN cadres and committing atrocities so as to discredit 
SWAPO. Subsequently, South Africa was able to secure immunity for any 
alleged atrocities its security forces may have committed, thereby pro-
tecting security forces personnel from extradition to Namibia. And the 
Namibian authorities declined to hold TRC-type hearings concerning 
allegations of misconduct by SADF members stationed in the country 
prior to independence probably because SWAPO wished to prevent rev-
elations of the torture and detention of its own people by members of 
54 Dale, “A Comparative Reconsideration of the Namibian Bush War,” 201.
55 Ibid., 200.
56 John Fitzgerald, “The Winter Soldier Hearings,” Radical History Review 97 (2007): 118–122.
57 Don Foster et al., The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of Protagonists in the South African 
Conflict (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2005).
246 Gary Baines
the organisation in Angolan camps. The exposure of the “wall of silence” 
has not reduced the clamour for restitution of reputations and repara-
tions by victims and their families.58 If anything, the failure to make full 
disclosures has seen the issue become a festering wound in the Namibian 
body politic. Whereas Vietnam has left a scar that apparently binds US 
society,59 southern African society’s wounds are still in need of suturing.
As with the aftermath of the Vietnam War, there has been something 
of a “silence” or selective amnesia with respect to the Border War. I have 
argued elsewhere that the absence of discourse on the Border War in the 
public sphere can be partly ascribed to the desire to construct a consensual 
past and new national identity – to the displacement of the divisions of 
apartheid by a preoccupation with making the “miracle” of the negotiated 
settlement work.60 However, this silence is gradually being eroded, and 
former SADF conscripts are finding their voices, although they obviously 
do not speak as one. This much was evident in the controversy that fol-
lowed the trustees of Freedom Park’s decision to omit the names of SADF 
veterans from the site’s Wall of Names.61 This “crisis of commemoration” 
echoes the tensions that followed the erection of the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial in Washington, D.C. in 1982. Whilst the American Memorial 
Wall has arguably done much to heal the wounds of the Vietnam War 
by affording veterans and the families and loved ones of those killed in 
the war a site at which to mourn their losses,62 in South Africa the com-
memoration of the Border War remains a fraught and unresolved issue. 
The loss of political power by the white minority meant that a wall of 
remembrance erected on Fort Klapperkop by the SADF to honour those 
killed serving their country has been divested of its symbolic power. It has 
been effectively eclipsed by a privately funded wall erected in the precinct 
58 Justine Hunter, “No Man’s Land of Time: Reflections on the Politics of Memory and Forget-
ting in Namibia,” – Baines and Vale, Beyond the Border War, 302–321.
59 Keith Beattie, The Scar that Binds: American Culture and the Vietnam War (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998).
60 Baines, “Introduction,” – Baines and Vale, Beyond the Border War.
61 Gary Baines, “Site of Struggle: the Freedom Park Fracas and the Divisive Legacy of South 
Africa’s Border War/Liberation Struggle,” Social Dynamics 35:2 (2009): 330–344.
62 Kristin Ann Hass, Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memo-
rial (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1998).
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of the Voortrekker Monument. Certain SADF veterans reckon that they 
deserve public recognition for the sacrifices they made to build the “new” 
South Africa. If their quest for validation and sense of victimisation is 
not addressed, there is a possibility that contested memories about the 
part played by the SADF in the country’s past might revive sectionalisms 
and threaten the social cohesion and stability of South Africa’s fragile 
 democracy.
The extant literature on the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-
combatants − especially from the ranks of liberation movements who are 
called non-statutory forces − into post-apartheid South African society 
shows that they are seen by the public in terms of poor, stereotypical 
images.63 Their reputation for being prone to violence and using military 
skills and weapons in criminal activities is as a result of publicity given 
to a few high-profile cases involving ex-combatants. But such demoniza-
tion is underserved. Similarly, US Vietnam veterans were portrayed by 
the media as dysfunctional “outcasts” and “psychopaths.” They returned 
home to find that their nation, and even their own families, had disowned 
their responsibility for the war and were blaming them instead. The scape-
goating of the veteran absolved the American public of complicity in the 
“bad” war as it did not challenge the myth of the US military as a force 
for moral good.64 In many instances, veterans were obliged to repress 
rather than come to terms with traumatic memories. Vietnam veterans’ 
trauma was only belatedly recognised when post-traumatic stress disor-
der became a diagnostic category in 1980.65 Acknowledgment of the work 
of the mental health profession and a changing political climate contrib-
uted to the rehabilitation of the Vietnam veteran. By contrast, little pro-
fessional counselling has been available to ex-combatants from the ranks 
of both the statutory and non-statutory forces in post-apartheid South 
Africa. The TRC recognized the need for this but neither it nor veterans’ 
63 Sasha Gear, Wishing Us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-Combatants in the New South Africa, 
Centre for the Study of Violence & Reconciliation, Violence & Transition Series No. 8 (Braam-
fontein: CSVR, 2002).
64 Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: the Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of 
Remembering (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1997), 66.
65 Nigel C. Hunt, Memory, War and Trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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associations have the resources to provide such services. Some ex-com-
batants have found spaces to tell their stories on internet sites and others 
have shared their stories with mental health practitioners and journalists. 
Indeed, the destigmatisation of PTSD in recent years has fuelled SADF 
veterans’ claims of victimhood that has, in turn, allowed them to voice 
their disaffection with the ANC government that is perceived to favour 
veterans of non-statutory forces with respect to the award of military pen-
sions. Such setbacks to healing and reconciliation are likely to undermine 
any strategy designed to promote the nation-building project.
From imagination to instruction
Although the USA had suffered an ignominious defeat in Vietnam, and 
the conflict (as we have seen) was only partly analogous with the situ-
ation in southern Africa, the vocabulary of the Vietnam War became 
ubiquitous in the discourse of South Africa’s armed formations. It also 
insinuated itself into the public consciousness. This can be ascribed to the 
close contemporaneity of the conflicts, as well as the saturation coverage 
thereof in popular media. Elsewhere, I have explained why the American 
experience of Vietnam resonated with white conscripts seeking to make 
sense of their experience of the Border War.66 This section will reveal how 
the lessons of Vietnam were appropriated by protagonists in the conflict.
The SADF’s counterinsurgency strategies in Namibia were mod-
elled on the lessons derived from a range of revolutionary wars. Over 
the years, SADF personnel were sent for training at institutions in the 
UK, France, USA, and Israel. Malan, for instance, attended courses at 
Fort Leavensworth in 1962.67 At this juncture, US forces had had little 
experience of counter-insurgency as they were only commencing with 
deployments in Vietnam and the Korean War had been an altogether dif-
ferent kind of undertaking. So the most successful models of counter-
66 Gary Baines, “South Africa's Vietnam? Literary History and Cultural Memory of the Border 
War,” South African Historical Journal 49 (2003): 172–192.
67 Malan, My Life in the SADF, 42.
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insurgency wars were deemed to be the British campaigns in Malaya and 
Kenya, and that of Ramon  Magsaysay in the Philippines.68 The French 
record of mounting counter-insurgency campaigns in Indo-China and 
Algeria was poor when measured simply in terms of outcomes but the 
resemblances between the situation in the North African colony with its 
well-entrenched settler minority and South Africa were striking. Closer 
to home, the SADF could draw upon the experience of having supported 
the Portuguese army in Angola during the last phase of that war, and 
knowledge gleaned from units such as the paratroopers deployed against 
guerrillas in Rhodesia. The SADF was also intent on testing its strategies 
against PLAN and adapting these and applying them against the armed 
wings (or guerrillas) of the South African liberation movements.
Notwithstanding the desultory record of the French army, the SADF 
brains trust were enamoured with their COIN doctrine which was drawn 
from their experience in Indochina and Algeria.69 Lt. Gen. C.F. “Pops” 
Fraser, then Chief of the Army, was the doyen of SADF military thinkers 
on the subject of counterinsurgency and P.W. Botha’s “favourite military 
theorist.”70 He introduced the writings of French COIN specialist André 
Beaufre, then Director of the French Institute for Security Studies, to the 
SADF. Beaufre’s classic text An Introduction to Strategy (1963) was the 
primary inspiration for Fraser’s manual entitled Lessons Drawn from Past 
Revolutionary Wars (1966). It was translated into Afrikaans and became 
prescribed reading for the SADF officer corps. Lessons gleaned from 
Beaufre, as well as the American military strategist John McCuen’s The 
Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency 
(1966), were set out in the course materials of the officer corps developed 
at the Saldanha Military Academy and training manuals produced for the 
troops.71 
68 Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Faraway Places: The Genesis of the Modern World. 1945–65 
(London: Macmillan, 2013).
69 See John Daniel, “Racism, the Cold War and South Africa’s regional security” – Cold War in 
Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, ed. Sue Onslow (London: Routledge, 2009), 38.
70 Stephen Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2001), 278.
71 Leopold Scholtz, The SADF and the Border War 1966–1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 
2013), 36.
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Although SADF COIN thinking adapted these lessons to suit regional 
conditions, it is doubtful whether the SADF intelligentsia developed and 
refined a thoroughly novel COIN doctrine.72 The SADF maxim was that 
the war was 20% military and 80% political, and so soldiers were deployed 
in civic action programmes (or psychological operations) designed to win 
the “hearts and minds” (WHAM) of Namibians.73 In tandem with WHAM, 
the SADF conducted counterinsurgency operations that involved free fire 
zones, search and destroy missions, cross-border hot pursuit operations, 
and raids, and gauged success in terms of the body count. As with the 
US forces that adopted a policy of “Vietnamisation” so as to restrict the 
escalation of its own troop levels, the SADF resorted to the “Namibianisa-
tion” of the war to limit casualties amongst white conscripts. This involved 
introducing conscription to Namibia in 1980 and the establishment of 
the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) whose members were 
70 percent black.74 Thus both the US and SA forces sought to hand over 
increased responsibility for fighting to their allies amongst the local and/
or indigenous population in their respective theatres of war. The SADF 
preferred not to deploy large numbers of its troops and equipment at 
any one time by avoiding large-scale engagements with the Angolan and 
Cuban forces. It also “outsourced” much of its fighting to surrogates such 
as UNITA. And it adopted a form of warfare that combined a motorised 
infantry with superior firepower that performed well in the vast spaces of 
the Angolan-Namibian bush. This tradition of mobile warfare dates back 
to the commando system and might well be called the “South African way 
of war.”75 It was developed with the terrain and the low-density population 
of the sub-continent in mind and resembled American strategy in Viet-
nam that saw no benefit in holding ground for its own sake. This practice 
was inexplicably abandoned during the (set-piece) battle of Cuito Cua-
navale where attrition became the order of the day.
72 Richard Dale, “A Comparative Reconsideration of the Namibian Bush War, 1966–89,” Small 
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SADF generals insisted that they had learnt from the mistakes of the 
Americans in Vietnam and to have adapted their tactics accordingly. The 
SADF recognised the necessity of maintaining continuity in operations 
and opted for a system whereby troops were deployed in their units in the 
“operational area” for periods ranging from 3 to 12 months – depending 
whether they were national servicemen or citizen force members. In other 
words, the SADF soldiers generally served for shorter periods, but care 
was taken to ensure continuity between those departing and those being 
deployed. This helped circumvent the problem of the loss of institutional 
knowledge that the US forces in Vietnam faced as a result of the con-
stant rotation of individuals who completed their 365 days’ tours of duty. 
There was also a greater age differential amongst the SADF troops as both 
national service and citizen force units were deployed.76 SADF apologists 
also claimed that their troops were tougher and more disciplined than the 
US forces in Vietnam, even asserting that there was no “drug problem” 
in the SADF.77 Anecdotal evidence contradicts these unfounded claims 
made to impress upon the West that the SADF was not only capable of 
producing the finest armed force on the African continent but that it was 
even capable of teaching the Americans a thing or two about waging a 
counterinsurgency war.
Unlike the Vietnam War, media coverage of the Angolan/Namib-
ian War was censored. For instance, the South African news “blackout” 
of the Angolan invasion of 1975–1976 was exposed by foreign journal-
ists. And when the story broke, an attempt was made by the government 
to cajole newspaper editors to agree not to publish disclosures that did 
not emanate from official sources.78 Invoking national security, the state 
restricted access to information, while disinformation and propaganda 
was fed to an undiscerning public. The SADF had its own mouthpiece in 
76 Gretchen Rudham, “Lost Soldiers from Lost Wars: A Comparative Study of the Collective 
Experience of Soldiers of the Vietnam War and the Angolan/Namibian Border War” (MA the-
sis, University of Cape Town, 2003), 24.
77 Sheila Roberts, “The Invisible Enemy: South African Border War Narratives” – Readings in 
the Post-Colonial Literatures in English, ed. R. Grangvist (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), 97–98.
78 Graeme Addison, “Censorship of the press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case 
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the magazine Paratus, but the government also used slush funds to estab-
lish front organisations that published newspapers such as The Citizen 
and periodicals like To the Point to propagate its agenda. The mainstream 
media − the Afrikaans and English press, as well as the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) that monopolised radio and televi-
sion broadcasts (the latter from 1976) − lent their unqualified support 
to the SADF as the provider of security and stability in the country but 
prevaricated when it came to recognizing the legitimacy of its opera-
tions in Angola/Namibia. Otherwise, the SADF attempted to win over 
independent local media by inviting carefully vetted (photo)journalists 
and military correspondents to visit SADF units in the operational area. 
These journalists were more like their “embedded” counterparts in the 
Gulf Wars than those who operated outside of military strictures in Viet-
nam. The mistaken lesson learned by the apartheid regime from the Viet-
nam War was that unrestricted media coverage of war could undermine 
public support for the war effort. The media might have created greater 
awareness of the situation, even contributed to the growth of opposition 
to the war, but it alone was not responsible for the decline of political will 
to see the war through. The Vietnam War was actually lost on the battle-
field and the messenger became a convenient scapegoat. In fact, South 
African censorship fuelled rumour mongering and undermined civilian 
morale and was counter-productive as far as sustaining support for the 
fighting in Angola/ Namibia.79 While the majority of the white elector-
ate was inclined to accept official news releases at face value, the black 
populace treated them with increasing credulity. Although the libera-
tion movements could not compete with the apartheid state in terms of 
resources, the ANC still managed to recruit cadres to undergo military 
training abroad through its Radio Freedom broadcasts.
From the vantage point of exile, the ANC leadership drew rather 
different lessons from Vietnam than the SADF hierarchy. The organisa-
tion became convinced that they were capable of humbling a militarily 
powerful adversary like the apartheid state by adopting the strategy of a 
people’s war – the mobilisation of the bulk of the population in the war 
79 Baines, “Introduction,” 10.
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effort.80 The organisation’s delegation that visited Vietnam in 1978 came 
away with the distinct impression that too much emphasis had been 
placed on the armed struggle at the expense of political mobilisation. The 
primacy of political imperatives in the armed struggle, an approach in 
keeping with Maoist approach to guerrilla war, was given due recogni-
tion in The Green Book: Lessons from Vietnam, which was published in 
1979 with the imprimatur of the ANC’s national executive committee.81 
This blueprint for waging a protracted people’s war advocated, inter alia, 
restructuring MK and forging a network of armed units that would ulti-
mately constitute a people’s revolutionary army, improving MK’s military 
training programmes so as to enable it to mount attacks against security 
targets and the establishment, and stepping up propaganda and agitation. 
Such a strategic review would compensate for ANC weakness vis-à-vis 
the apartheid security forces. It offered a way of defeating Pretoria politi-
cally without having to engage in a military confrontation that MK had no 
hope of winning. According to Jeffery, it mattered very little to the ANC 
that the situation in Vietnam was very different from that pertaining in 
South Africa.82 In other words, “the objective conditions for a people’s war 
in the Vietnamese sense did not exist.”83 If the was the case, then Vietnam 
did not serve so much as a model to be emulated but a morale booster – as 
affirmation that victory could be secured irrespective of the odds.
It has been charged that the ANC never sought to defeat the South 
African security forces on the battlefield but gave priority to eliminating 
its political rivals, the other liberation movements.84 Similar claims have 
been made with respect to Vietnam. This line of arguments holds that the 
80 Stephen Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2011), 123; 
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Vietcong (or National Liberation Front, NLF) the guerrilla army based in 
South Vietnam, was purposefully targeted for elimination by the North 
Vietnamese during the 1968 Tet offensive. It is reckoned that the NLF was 
deliberately sent into battle inadequately trained and equipped to with-
stand American firepower, while the more formidable regular North Viet-
namese Army (NVA) units were held in reserve. It is suggested that this 
tactic was pursued because the North Vietnamese feared that the Vietcong 
would not join the communist alliance but form an opposition grouping 
when the country was re-united. This argument has a number of flaws. 
If the Vietcong was virtually eliminated, it begs the question as to why 
Operation Phoenix that identified and removed VC cadres from the field 
was necessary. It also ignores the substantial evidence that the VC played a 
significant role in the liberation of South Vietnam after the withdrawal of 
US forces. As Peter Brush concludes, not only is there irrefutable evidence 
that the Vietcong were not eliminated in 1968, they were an important 
component of communist strategy to the very end of the war.”85 The same 
can be said of the “comrades” who formed themselves into armed militias 
and emulated ANC strategy as far as they understood it. While not part 
of the ANC’s command structure, they armed and constituted themselves 
as members of township street committees that rendered the country 
“ungovernable.”86 They might not have been instrumental in overthrow-
ing the apartheid state, but the “comrades” contributed to its demise.
Realistic assessments of the prospects of the triumph of the armed 
struggle tempered hopes that tanks would trundle into the streets of Pre-
toria as had been the case when the NVA overran Saigon. Yet, the Viet-
nam analogy was an inspiration to the ANC leadership in exile as well as 
those operatives who infiltrated the country. When reflecting upon the 
significance of the visit by the ANC delegation to Vietnam nearly three 
decades earlier, President Thabo Mbeki called Ho Chi Minh and General 
Vo Nguyen Giap inspirational leaders and strategists.87 And former MK 
85 Peter Brush, “The Significance of Local Communist Forces in Post-Tet Vietnam,” https://
msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/pbsignif.html (accessed 4 April 2017).
86 Janet Cherry, Umkhonto weSizwe (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2011), 90–91.
87 Cited in Anthea Jeffery, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa (Johannes-
burg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2009), xxxiii.
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combatant Joseph Kobo recalls entering South Africa via routes through 
Botswana, Rhodesia, and other frontline states dubbed the Ho Chi Minh 
trail.88 Whether these names or even the story of the anti-colonial strug-
gle in Vietnam was familiar to the ANC’s rank and file is a moot point. 
But there was a mystique to the name Vietnam.
As far as the generals of the SADF were concerned, the lessons to be 
gleaned from the Vietnam analogy were salutary. In tandem with their 
own experience and that derived from studying the literature on other 
counterinsurgency wars, the lessons of Vietnam could provide a winning 
formula. They believed that if these were applied then victory might be 
assured.89 So from the perspective of the SADF combating the military 
wings of the ANC and SWAPO, Vietnam offered a negative model. Con-
versely, the ANC regarded it as providing positive pointers for success-
fully defeating the apartheid state. These diametrically opposed lessons 
serve to underscore the argument that the lessons to be derived from 
analogies might be instructive but by no means definitive.
Conclusion
It seems fair to conclude that the Vietnam analogy does not amount to a 
valid historical comparison between the conflicts in south-east Asia and 
southern Africa. It is simply a figure of speech with rhetorical valence. 
It might be good for purposes of instruction, but is bad for a nuanced 
appreciation of history. However, the vocabulary of Vietnam undeniably 
evokes collective memory and contributes to a sense of shared experi-
ence.90 This is precisely why it appears to have so much purchase in the 
public domain, especially for those with limited knowledge of the events 
88 Joseph Kobo, Waiting in the Wings: The Electrifying Story of a Bishop Who Was once in the 
Military Wing of the ANC (Milton Keynes: Nelson Word, 1994).
89 Jannie Geldenhuys, At the Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s Border War (Johan-
nesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2009).
90 Brian Balogh, “From metaphor to quagmire: the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War,” – 
After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War, ed. Charles E. Neu (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University, 2000), 52.
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being compared. This applies equally to military and political leaders who 
are inclined to treat history as nothing more than a series of lessons that 
can be applied to find solutions to present predicaments. For them his-
tory has utilitarian value but little else. Obviously such an approach to 
history should not be condoned, let alone validated. I have made a con-
certed effort to avoid doing so in this paper.
My narrative has proffered a string of resemblances between conflicts 
in southern Africa and south-east Asia. I have attempted to provide a 
multi-layered account of these conflicts. It might be argued that my com-
parisons are too neat and tidy – that my exposition is skewed towards 
highlighting the similarities rather than the differences between these 
wars. Moreover, my approach might be said to hinder rather than assist 
our understanding of the complexities of these respective conflicts. This 
is no doubt true. On the other hand, I have resisted the reductionism 
characteristic of comparative diplomatic and political thinking – even of 
much military history. Instead, I have viewed the Vietnam War as an his-
torical event and not simply as a lesson. So I have not sought to plumb 
the past for easy lessons. In fact, I am not persuaded that military and 
political leaders actually learn from the past. For them history provides 
a rhetorical device rather than an analytical tool and serves a political 
rather than a pedagogical purpose.
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